Summary
of
our research
(updated
12/11/21)
Robert
G. Mays, BSc, and Suzanne B. Mays, AAS, CMP
(printable
version PDF, 128K, 11 pages)
We propose that the human
being consists of (1) an energetic,
spatially extended, non-material “mind”
that is united
with (2) a material brain and body. The
mind is a “field
of consciousness”; it is non-material
(does not consist of material atoms) but rather
is a structured, energetic region of space that
can interact
with physical processes. The mind is
united and co-extensive
with the brain and body and interacts
directly with brain neurons.
The basic evidence for
this proposal derives from near-death
experience (NDE) phenomena and various
neurological phenomena especially phantom limbs.
A
primary characteristic of many near-death
experiences (NDEs) is a shift
in the
experiencer’s self-conscious awareness from
within the body
to outside the
body, with the individual hovering several
feet above his physical
body,
watching the efforts to revive him. The NDE
typically begins with the
transition outside of the body, followed by
experiences of the
immediate
physical environs, then further experiences
such as a dark tunnel and a
light,
and ends with a return to the body. While
outside the body, the
experiencer
retains nearly all of the ordinary conscious
faculties including
perception,
thought, volition, memory, feelings and
self-awareness. In a number of
cases,
the NDE has been shown to have occurred when
the body and brain were
clinically
dead, as in cardiac arrest, and yet the
patient still had rich
cognitive
experiences during the period of complete loss
of cortical and brain
stem
activity, including veridical
(accurate, real) perceptions of the immediate
physical
environs
that were later verified (van Lommel, van
Wees, Meyers, and Elfferich,
2001).
The
prevalent view of neuroscience is that
consciousness requires physical
brain
activity. Yet the patient in an NDE
experiences a continuity of
self-conscious
awareness from being within the body, through
the transition outside
the body,
frequently with veridical experiences of the
world during periods of
unconsciousness and complete cessation of
brain function, and finally
transitioning back into the body. The NDE
appears to be a continuous,
seamless
experience of the same self,
a self
who retains a continuity of memory from before
the beginning of the NDE
to
after the return to the body. The NDE is
integrated into the
person’s memory
much like any other significant life
experience.
If
our consciousness can separate from and
operate independently of our
body for a
time, albeit during an NDE, consciousness most
likely operates as an
independent, autonomous entity as
well
while we are in the body. In the latter case,
however, our
consciousness is
intimately united with the body and brain, and
requires electrical
brain
activity to function. The phenomena associated
with the out-of-body
experience
(OBE) component of the NDE, where the
experiencer feels separated from
the body
but still has veridical experiences of the
ordinary physical environs,
thus can
give us indications of what aspects of
consciousness are in fact
independent of
the brain. Conversely, the phenomena of
consciousness which are
associated with
physiological brain activity can give us
indications how our autonomous
consciousness operates when united with the
brain.
The
problem of consciousness can thus be addressed
by studying the
phenomenology of
these two aspects of conscious experience,
namely, the OBE associated
with NDEs
and the neural correlates of consciousness. In
our first paper (Mays
and Mays,
2007a), we examined the first of these
aspects, focusing on the
relevant
phenomena of the NDE OBE. These phenomena
strongly suggest that
consciousness
is an entity in and of itself, which we call
the independent
self-conscious mind. A subsequent paper
(Mays and Mays,
2007b) examined the second aspect, that is,
neurological phenomena
which
indicate that there is a non-electrical agency
that induces
consciousness, and
other mind-brain phenomena that can be
explained in terms of the
self-conscious
mind. A third paper (Mays
and Mays,
2007c)
described additional neurological phenomena
which also tend to confirm
the view that consciousness arises
within the
autonomous self-conscious mind operating
within the brain and body.
The
phenomenological method we use in this
research is based on
Goethean
phenomenology, recently described by Arthur
Zajonc (1999), a method of
inquiry
based on the three stages of inquiry proposed
by J. W. von Goethe: (1)
“empirical phenomena” which are the ordinary
observations an attentive observer
would make, (2) “scientific phenomena” which
are
examined through systematic
experimentation, and (3) “pure or archetypal
phenomena” which permit a direct
intuition of or perceptual encounter with the
laws of nature. The last
step
occurs not through abstraction and
construction of models but rather by
refining the phenomena themselves to arrive at
the essence or core of
the
phenomena. In his work, Goethe was very
reluctant to proceed
immediately to
define the causes of observational patterns in
terms of underlying
mechanisms,
but allowed for this when it was sensible to
do so. It is possible to
remain at
every stage of explanation within the
phenomenal and still rise to the
level of
theory (Zajonc, 1999). For Goethe, the
phenomenal facts themselves are
the theory.
In
order to explain consciousness, we need to
look foremost at
consciousness
itself and every way in which consciousness
manifests as phenomena.
This would
include the phenomena of the near-death
experience but equally as well
brain
phenomena and neurological experimental
results.
The
Near-Death Experience
The
near-death experience typically occurs when a
person has a medical
crisis which
brings the person close to death (Greyson,
2000). Raymond Moody (1975)
described
15 common elements which recurred in NDE
reports, including
ineffability,
hearing oneself pronounced dead, having
feelings of peace, having
unusual
auditory experiences such as ringing or
buzzing, passing through a dark
region
or tunnel, feeling oneself separated from the
physical body –
usually with
perception of the physical environs including
seeing one’s
own body,
encountering deceased relatives or friends,
meeting a “being
of light”,
experiencing a panoramic review of the events
of one’s life,
experiencing
coming back into the body, and telling others
of the experience
including
corroborating events witnessed while out of
the body. Moody reported
that very
many individual near-death experiences
included 8 or more of these
common
elements but it was rare that any two
experiences had exactly the same
elements
and only a few experiences included as many as
12 of the 15 elements.
NDEs
are reported by about 30% of people who come
close to death (cf.
Greyson, 2000)
or about 4-5% of the total population (Gallup
and Proctor, 1982). A
number of
both psychological and physiological
explanatory hypotheses have been
proposed
to explain NDEs (Greyson, 1998). One
psychological hypothesis is that
the NDE
is a form of depersonalization,
that
is, a feeling of being separated from both the
world and
one’s own identity, or
feeling that life is unreal and dreamlike.
However, the characteristics
of
NDEs, such as a clear sense of personal
identity, clarity of thought,
increased
alertness, and an out-of-body component, are
very different from
depersonalization. Another psychological
hypothesis is that the NDE is
a form
of dissociation, that is,
some
degree
of separation of thoughts, emotions,
sensations or memories from
one’s ordinary
consciousness. While many NDEs include
features that are consistent
with
dissociation such as the disconnection from
the body in an OBE, the
level of
dissociative symptoms exhibited by NDErs is
considerably lower than the
levels
of distress or impairment, for example,
associated with pathological
dissociative disorders.
Physiological
explanatory hypotheses for the NDE include
hypoxia (insufficient
oxygen),
hypercarbia (excessive carbon dioxide levels),
the release of
endorphins or
various neurotransmitters, neural electrical
activity in the right
temporal
lobe or the limbic system, the presence of
various drugs or as yet
unidentified
endogenous equivalents, and so on. In
general these explanations suffer from the
fact that these conditions
are not
present in all cases of NDE. No physiological
theory has yet been
proposed that
can satisfactorily explain all of the common
elements of NDEs (Greyson,
1998).
The
OBE
component of the NDE
Our
first paper (Mays and Mays, 2007a) focused on
the OBE component of the
NDE,
that is, when the NDEr experiences a
separation from the physical body
and has
awareness of the immediate physical environs.
The phenomenology of the
OBE
occurring during NDE should help in
understanding the nature of
consciousness,
since the NDEr’s consciousness appears to
separate from the
physical body at
the start of the OBE and later appears to
reunite with the body.
Furthermore,
during the OBE component, perceptions of the
NDEr’s physical
environs are made
which appear to be veridical, and their
veridicality can potentially be
corroborated.
Our view is that
the
self-conscious mind (SCM) is an independent
entity
that is united with the brain and body in
ordinary life and may
separate from
the body in the unusual circumstance of the
near-death experience. The
out-of-body component of the NDE provides
evidence to support this view
in four
ways:
- Consciousness
continues in the NDE out-of-body experience
during cardiac arrest, even
during periods of global cerebral
isoelectricity (flatline EEG).
Veridical perceptions during this time
establish that lucid
consciousness still functions. There is a
continuity of self-conscious
experience, which spans the time the patient
was in the body, then
separated from it, and then reunited with
the body. The experience is
integrated by the patient in memory as a
single, continuous experience,
even though it occurred during periods of
complete demonstrable
cerebral incapacity.
- The NDEr
experiences
her consciousness as separate from the body,
typically hovering near
the ceiling, while the body is unconscious.
Veridical perceptions
during the NDE OBE, which could only have
occurred if consciousness had
operated in a location distant from the
body, confirm this subjective
experience. The details of purely visual
veridical perceptions and
their timing show that these perceptions
could not have been
constructed by the imagination from
subliminal impressions received by
the brain.
- Comparison of
the
NDE OBE with other types of OBEs
(spontaneous, willed, induced by
hypnosis, electrical brain stimulation or
drugs, etc.) suggests that
there is a relationship between the degree
of apparent separation from
the body in the NDE OBE and the veridical
perceptions that are
experienced, as compared with other types of
OBEs. The NDE has both a
greater apparent separation and a greater
incidence of accurate,
verified perceptions.
- The
phenomenology of
the NDE OBE shows that the NDEr’s
consciousness operates with
the same cognitive faculties of perception,
thought, will, memory, and
feelings as were present while in the body,
but many of them are
enhanced, having greater acuity and agility.
There is a continuity of
the NDEr’s memory and the sense of self,
which continue from
being in the body, to being out of the body,
and then back to the body.
During the NDE OBE, the NDEr feels she is
the same person as before,
but is now freed of the constraints and
limitations of the body. The
return to the body brings back all of the
characteristics of the body:
weight, fatigue, physical pain and any
pre-existing disabilities. The
NDE OBE is thus a coherent, self-consistent
experience, implying that
separation of consciousness from the body in
fact occurs.
During
the NDE OBE, the individual appears to be a
complete human being, the same
human being who was present prior
to the NDE, except for the physical body. The
phenomenon of apparent
separation
of consciousness in the NDE OBE is a coherent
and self-consistent
experience,
which implies a separation in
fact
of
consciousness from the physical body.
The
Independent Self-Conscious Mind
The
NDE OBE strongly suggests that consciousness
can operate completely
independently of the body and still possess
all of the faculties and
attributes
of ordinary consciousness in the body, namely,
perception, volition,
feelings,
thought and memory. With cases of cardiac
arrest especially, it can be
demonstrated that there is no physiological
functioning of the brain or
brain
stem during significant portions of the OBE.
Furthermore, the quality
of
awareness is not diminished during the OBE as
in a dream-like state,
but rather
is the same as, or even more intense than,
ordinary waking
consciousness.
The
transitions out of the body and back to the
body occur seamlessly, that
is,
there is a continuous sense of selfhood and
memory through both
transitions. The
experiencer feels herself to be the same self
in transitioning out of
body, as
well as returning to it, having the same
memories. The memories of
events
experienced while out of the body are
integrated seamlessly with the
experiencer’s memories, both before and after
the NDE. In
short, the
experiencer’s self-conscious awareness, or
sense of self, is
felt to be
entirely the same self
before,
during, and after the NDE. The experience is
that one’s
unified conscious self
has gone through the near-death experience,
much like going through any
other
significant life experience.
Neurological
evidence of the independent self-conscious
mind
If
consciousness can separate from and operate
completely independently of
the
body in the NDE OBE, then neurological
phenomena should be evident that
show
there is a unified conscious self which
operates in
the body in ordinary consciousness. In
our second paper (Mays
and Mays, 2007b), three neurological phenomena
were presented that
suggest
there is an agency that induces conscious
experience and
self-consciousness,
but which itself is not a form of neural
electrical activity. Electrical
brain stimulation shows that
electrical brain activity in itself is not
sufficient to produce actual
conscious awareness or intentional movements;
some agency other than
electrical
activity must be involved that brings about
our actual consciousness. Subjective
backward referral of sensory
experiences shows that there is no
neural mechanism that
can
mediate the
subjective backward spatial and temporal
referral of sensations; some
agency
other than electrical activity must “hold
together”
both the time and location
of the sensation while the sensation comes to
awareness over a period
of 500
msec. Large-scale
neural
synchrony shows that specific
endogenous
volitional tasks (recognition, decision, and
movement preparation) give
rise to
phase-locked synchronized neural activity
across widely separated
cortical
regions; some agency must interface in some
way with the electrical
activity of
the brain to bring this about. The agency
cannot itself be electrical
activity
because electrical brain stimulation, which
should disrupt the agency,
thereby
causing widespread disruptions to
consciousness, does not have that
effect.
We
propose that the non-electrical agency that
induces conscious
experiences and
self-consciousness in these three neurological
phenomena is the
consciousness
itself, which can operate independently of the
brain during the NDE
OBE, namely
the independent self-conscious
mind. During
the NDE OBE, the self-conscious mind (SCM)
appears as an independent
“field of
consciousness”. However, during ordinary
consciousness in the
body, the SCM is
united with the body and brain. Consciousness
within the body results
from a
form of induction between the brain and the
SCM. The phenomena of the
NDE OBE
are consistent with this view and provide many
details related to the
SCM. The
SCM carries all of our cognitive faculties
during the NDE but these are
restored to the body upon return to the body.
The SCM is non-material,
is
invisible to ordinary sight, cannot interact
significantly with
physical
objects, and so on. In ordinary life, the SCM
is strongly and
intimately
integrated with the body and brain; people
will ordinarily lose
consciousness
when the brain ceases to function. In only
about 30% of people who are
near to
death does the SCM separate from the
body.
Because
the SCM is perceived frequently in the NDE OBE
with a bodily form, this
form is
likely extended and integrated throughout the
body when the SCM is
united with the
body. Since some NDErs who had their NDE as
infants experienced
themselves as
fully developed adults with fully developed
perception, memory and
thought, the
SCM apparently already exists in fully
developed form during infancy,
rather
than developing during infancy as the body
does. During early
childhood, the
child’s development is a process of learning
how to integrate
the SCM with the
brain and body. Long-term memory resides with
the SCM, since memories
during
the NDE are formed and retained prior to the
return to the body. Thus
memories
themselves cannot be destroyed by the
destruction of brain structures.
However,
it is clear that memory formation and recall
while within the body are
mediated
by brain structures and pathways. The SCM is
the unitary field of our
consciousness and the seat of our
self-conscious awareness, both within
the
body and out of the body, which gives us the
sense of the continuity of
our
self throughout our life.
Our view of the
non-material self-conscious mind is very
similar in
a
number of respects to the dualist
interactionist model of Karl Popper
and John
Eccles (1977). However, there are several
differences. Likewise, our
view has similarities but also significant
differences with Benjamin
Libet’s
conscious mental field (2004).
Mind-brain
interactions
The
strongest objection to our view is that there
is no reasonable
explanation how the non-material mind can
interact with the brain. The
interaction must therefore be inaccessible to
scientific study. In
response, we
note that the phenomena of the mind, taken as
a whole, including the
phenomena
of the NDE OBE, do indicate
that
the
mind is non-material, and we contend that the
interactions of the SCM
with the
brain and body can be studied scientifically
through their associated
phenomena. One general approach is to
investigate the neural correlates
of
consciousness. The problem of correlating
internal mental experiences
with
observable neural events has been successfully
addressed by a number of
researchers using techniques including
cortical stimulation, forced
choice
protocols, and brain imaging technologies.
Another general approach to
scientific study is to investigate conscious
functions in patients with
brain
damage.
By
looking at existing, well-known neural
phenomena, the nature of the
interaction
between the mind and the brain can begin to be
deduced. Evidence from
electrical brain stimulation shows that brain-to-mind
induction of conscious experience very
likely results from
neural
electrical activity where in some way “we”
have
been involved. Evidence from
large-scale neural synchrony shows that our
conscious mental activities
induce
electrical neuronal effects through mind-to-brain
induction over widely distant points in
the brain. One such effect is
observed where the
subjective level of mental
intensity results in an overall higher-level
energy of electrical
activity.
Benjamin
Libet’s (2004) phenomenon of the delayed
awareness of willed
action, the famous
paradox that brain activity appears to start
before the
subject’s awareness of
his decision to move, can be explained by
assuming that there is a
delay
between making the decision within the SCM and
that decision coming to
our
awareness, much the same as the delay that
occurs in tactile sensations
coming
to awareness. Indeed, if the delay in
awareness of the endogenous
mental activity (deciding to “act now”) is the
same
500
msec as the delay in tactile sensations, then
the paradox is removed:
the
decision to move is made some 150 msec prior
to the brain’s
first response.
Libet’s paradox is now replaced by another
paradox: we
subconsciously decide to
move before we are aware of the decision. This
is not as difficult a
contradiction, because we always decide to act
out of a conscious
context. When
the SCM is united with the brain, all
conscious awareness, including
awareness
of our own decisions and thoughts, must come
through neural electrical
activity
in brain-to-mind induction.
Other
mind-brain phenomena
A
number of other brain phenomena are relevant
in understanding how the
self-conscious mind interacts with the brain.
Popper and Eccles (1977,
ch.
E5-E6) cite investigations of global lesions
of the cerebrum, including
commissurotomy (cutting the nerves joining the
two brain hemispheres,
resulting
in a “split brain”) and hemispherectomy
(removal of
one of the brain
hemispheres), as well as circumscribed
cerebral lesions in the
temporal,
parietal, occipital and frontal lobes. In each
case, the lesions give
us an
opportunity to discover the functions of the
missing brain regions as
well as
provide insight into how the mind as a whole
operates when united with
the
brain. For example, our awareness and sense of
self appear to remain
intact
through very drastic damage to brain
structures and function.
Our third paper
(Mays and Mays, 2007c) presented several different
cases
of reduced or altered neural function and how
they relate to the SCM, namely,
split-brain patients, hemispherectomy
patients, hydrocephalus patients, decorticate
patients, and patients
with
phantom limb phenomena.
Split-brain
patients are those who have
had the connections
between their two hemispheres severed in order
to control advanced
intractable
epilepsy. Despite the evident severity of such
an operation, the
split-brain
patient experiences no apparent serious effect
from the operation in
terms of
ordinary everyday behavior. However, with
appropriate testing
procedures, a
wide variety of distinct impairments can be
demonstrated in the
cross-integration of cerebral functions.
Postoperatively, these
patients
exhibit an apparent splitting of conscious
awareness where the patient
does not
become aware of perceptions which are received
only by the non-dominant
hemisphere.
Still, the patients claim that they do not
experience any
“dual consciousness”
that appears to be present (Gazzaniga, 2000).
These phenomena indicate
a
situation where the normal neural activity
across the hemispheres has
been
blocked. The lack of neural activity in the
dominant hemisphere
prevents the
perceptions from coming to consciousness,
consistent with the prior
observations that a certain duration of
electrical brain activity is
needed to
bring both sensations and endogenous mental
activity to consciousness.
The
severed corpus callosum prevents the neural
activity from reaching the
level of
conscious awareness. Nevertheless, the effects
of subliminal
experiences are
still present in the SCM and show themselves
to be present
subliminally, such
as with a patient’s emotional reaction to an
embarrassing
image which is shown
only to the non-dominant hemisphere.
Split-brain phenomena thus suggest
that
conscious awareness requires neural activity
in the dominant hemisphere
as the
last stage of “coming to awareness”. If this
neural
activity is blocked, the
awareness remains subliminal, but the fact
that the awareness is
subliminal
implies that the unity of consciousness is
preserved, even when
significant
neural damage has occurred, consistent with
our view.
Hemispherectomy,
hydrocephalus and decorticate patients all exhibit brain
structures which have been severely
compromised and yet all exhibit remarkable
motor, language and
cognitive
abilities given the degree of cerebral loss.
In hemispherectomy, one
cortical
hemisphere is removed, usually to treat
intractable unihemispheric
epilepsy. In
hydrocephalus, an abnormal increase in
cerebrospinal fluid causes an
increase
in the cerebral cavities and a distortion of
brain structures.
Decorticate
patients are born without cerebral
hemispheres. In all three cases, the
SCM is
able to adapt to severely compromised neural
pathways to achieve a high
level
of function. The SCM operates within whatever
brain structures are
present. The
SCM is thus shown to be whole and complete in
itself and not the product of
neural function. Evidently,
the SCM can adapt most easily to gradual
changes in neural structures,
for
example due to slow disease processes rather
than sudden brain trauma
or
stroke. Sudden changes appear to overwhelm or
“isolate” the SCM and inhibit
adaptation. Even so, adaptation appears to be
facilitated by bodily
movement in
conjunction with relearning cognitive skills.
Also, there appears to be
a
certain level of “neural capacity” below which
cognitive functions appear to
become crowded, implying that the SCM requires
a minimum neural
capacity to
support particular functions.
The
phantom limb is the vivid
experience of a limb that
has been amputated but subjectively is still
present. Phantom limb
patients
frequently experience pain in the non-existent
limb and can sometimes
feel
delayed tactile sensations when another part
of the body, for example
near the
point of amputation or on the face, is gently
rubbed. There are
electrical
anomalies, called “reorganizations”, in the
sensory
and motor cortex which
appear when there is phantom limb pain. Our
view is that the
non-material SCM has a spatial shape similar
to the physical body. The
spatial
shape includes “mind-limbs” which are visible
to
many NDErs during their OBE.
The phantom limb is the continued conscious
experience of the mind-limb
when
the body limb is not present. A number of
phenomena related to phantom
limbs
can thereby be explained which give insight
into mind-to-brain and
brain-to-mind
induction. In particular, the experience of
pain is the result of the
mind
still attempting to project the mind-arm into
a non-existent physical
arm. The
mind-arm seeks its normal bodily neural
pathways but they now reach
only to the
stump and the mind-arm becomes “diffuse” and
disorganized. If the
disorganization is too great, certain cortical
reorganization appears
and pain
is experienced. However, when the patient uses
a functional prosthesis,
the
mind-arm can now project into the prosthesis
and becomes focused again
into a
physical “arm”. The cortical electrical
reorganization is reduced and the pain
stops. Researchers have found that the active
use of a functional
prosthesis is
positively correlated with reduced cortical
reorganization and reduced
phantom
pain. Our view of the SCM thus provides a
comprehensive
explanation of
phantom limb phenomena.
Our view of the
self-conscious mind is that it is whole and
complete in
itself. When the SCM separates from the body
in the NDE OBE, it
recovers
sensory functions such as sight, which may
have been impaired, and it
is no
longer constrained by physical disabilities.
But when united with the
body, the
autonomous SCM must operate through
the physical brain for us to be conscious and
to have cognitive
function. When
the brain is dysfunctional or damaged in some
way, the operation of the
SCM is
impaired and difficulties with cognitive
functions result.
Nevertheless, while
in the body, the SCM appears to be able to
overcome significant neural
damage
by transference of function to other brain
regions. The appropriate
perspective
in these cases is not the plasticity
of
neural function, but rather the adaptability
of the SCM to relearn cognitive
functions, in the face of
reduced or
altered neural function.
Mechanism
for mind-brain interactions
The
question remains regarding the nature of
mind-brain interactions: how
can the
non-material mind interact with the physical
brain? In particular, how
can the
non-material mind interact with the physical
brain when it
doesn’t seemingly interact
with other physical things while out of the
body (e.g., passing through
physical objects)?
Brain-to-mind
induction can be demonstrated
with external
electrical stimulation of the sensory cortical
areas or the temporal
lobes,
which simulates natural
neural
electrical activity and produces conscious
experiences (sensations,
percepts,
feelings and memory sequences). This
phenomenon implies that
naturally-occurring neural electrical activity
from sensory brain
processes
induces conscious experience of actual
percepts. Mind-to-brain
induction can be demonstrated with
particular endogenous
mental states, such as a willed movement,
concentrated attention or the
recognition of an image, which cause
identifiable electrical brain
activity
such as the readiness potential (RP) and
characteristic patterns of
large-scale
neural synchrony.
In
both cases of induction, brain-to-mind and
mind-to-brain, it is
reasonable to
propose that the two kinds of induction are
equivalent, perhaps
symmetrical or
complementary. The phenomena indicate that the
induction operates from
one
aspect of reality (physical brain functions)
to another aspect of
reality
(mind) and vice versa. The actual process of
mutual induction between
the two
aspects of reality must be identified by
considering agencies beyond
ordinary
physical processes, because the mind is
non-material and not yet well
understood.
The
really “hard problem” of consciousness
(Chalmers,
1995) is the problem of experience,
that is, how physical brain
processes give rise to subjective experience,
and why the performance
of
specific brain functions is accompanied by
experience. In order to
develop a
theory of consciousness and experience from
the phenomena, we propose
considering the problem from two aspects: how
the self-conscious mind,
when united with the body,
interacts with
physical brain processes to give rise to
experience, and how the
self-conscious mind, when independent
of the body, interacts with physical processes
(and other mind
processes) to
give rise to experience. There are thus two
classes of phenomena to be
studied:
(1) the neural correlates of conscious
experiences, from the
perspective of the
autonomous mind operating through
the
brain, and (2) the experiences of the mind
within physical environs,
when it is
independent of the body in a veridical NDE
OBE.
In
the first class of phenomena, certain
electrical brain activity
interacts or
interfaces with the self-conscious mind in a
certain way to give rise
to a
specific subjective experience. Indeed, the
SCM unites with the brain
as a
whole in particular ways which can be
described, mapped out and
explained.
Exactly how the mind-brain interface works can
be studied via neural
correlates
of consciousness: a particular set of evoked
and event related
potentials give
rise to the experience of a sensation; a
particular volitional or
attentional
state in the mind gives rise to particular
synchronous electrical brain
activity. Thus, the physiological and
electromagnetic aspects of
mind-brain
induction can probably be found and described
in detail and the
existence and
properties of the non-material SCM can be
inferred indirectly
from the interaction of the mind with the
brain and
body.
The
second class of phenomena, namely the
experiences of the SCM when it is
out of
the body but still within physical environs,
needs to be studied from a
number
of perspectives, for example, the nature of
the interaction of the
out-of-body
mind with physical phenomena such as light,
sound, heat and physical
surfaces,
the shape and structure of the mind’s
“body”, the relationship of thought and
volition, the nature of memory in the
out-of-body state, the
interaction of the
out-of-body mind with other minds both
embodied and out-of-body, and so
on.
This class of phenomena requires much more
attention than it has
hitherto been
afforded. A detailed study of the veridical
NDE OBE is needed, but to
date it
appears we have only tantalizing hints of the
detailed OBE
phenomenology. For
example, the mind’s “body” appears to
have an intricate, luminous structure, at
least in some NDErs (Moody and Perry, 1988);
the NDEr’s sight
appears to be
more complex than normal vision, having at
times such qualities as
enhanced
clarity and focus, omnidirectional awareness
and synesthesia, that is,
sensations with more than one sensory quality
such as tones and colors
(Ring
and Cooper, 1999).
How
the out-of-body SCM interacts with physical
processes is of particular
interest
because it can elucidate the aspects of the
interface of the SCM with
the
brain. While the phenomena of the NDEr’s
interactions with
physical reality
have not yet been systematically studied,
various NDE OBE accounts
indicate in
general that the NDEr’s “body” is
non-material and does not interact
significantly
with objects, because it appears to pass
easily through them. However,
interactions with physical substances and
energies do appear to occur,
and include
subtle interactions in different modalities.
Some NDErs report a slight
resistance in passing through objects and the
ability to lightly touch
the
surface of a ceiling. Sight for at least some
NDErs is dependent on
actual
illumination by light. Some NDErs report that
they can hear, for
example, heart
monitors or fluorescent lights, implying an
interaction with vibrations
in the
air. There are a few accounts of ordinary
people feeling subtle
interactions
with the NDEr, for example, when the NDEr has
playfully touched their
face. Finally,
the NDEr “body” appears luminous in some way
to the
NDEr, that is, giving off
light of its own, although that light can’t be
seen by
ordinary people.
While
these accounts are fragmentary, they suggest
that there is a subtle
interaction
between the NDEr “body” (i.e., the SCM) and
physical objects, electromagnetic
radiation, and vibrations in the air, and that
the interactions are
subtly perceptible
by another person’s nervous system. If the SCM
can interact
in subtle ways with
physical objects and air vibrations, and can
directly
“perceive”
electromagnetic radiation (light) when out of
the body, then the SCM
likely can
interface in some way the electrical activity
of the brain when it is
united
with the body, in brain-to-mind induction.
Similarly, if the
out-of-body SCM
can be luminous in some way, it may similarly
be able to induce
electrical
brain activity. If the accounts of an NDEr’s
touch being felt
by an in-body
person prove accurate in multiple cases, this
would provide further
support for
the ability of the SCM to interact with the
nervous system in
mind-to-brain
induction.
We
would expect such mind-brain induction
processes to be perfectly
“tuned” for
efficient interactions between mind and brain
and we would expect
brain-to-mind
and mind-to-brain induction to be
complementary or symmetrical to one
another,
perhaps similar to the way that electric and
magnetic fields are
mutually
inductive.
Mind
is a
fundamental entity, a new dimension of
reality
Another basic
objection
to the view that the non-material mind
interacts with the
brain is that such mind-body
interactions would violate
the laws
of physics, in particular the law of
conservation of energy (that the
total
amount of kinetic and potential energy in an
isolated system remains
constant).
Thus, our view will ultimately need to explain
not only how the
non-material mind interacts with the brain,
but also how a non-material
consciousness occupies a particular location
in space with a particular
cohesive “body” form, and how memories are
formed,
“stored” and recalled in a
non-material field of consciousness.
In
Goethean phenomenology, the phenomena are
the theory, and in this case, the fundamental
phenomena are
clear: the
veridical OBE component of the NDE suggests
that consciousness can
operate
completely independently of the body, and a
number of neural electrical
phenomena suggest that a non-material agency
induces conscious
experiences and
self-consciousness while in the body. If the
phenomena of the mind
can’t be
explained by our known physical laws, then the
mind must be a
fundamental
entity, a new, non-material dimension of
reality, one that involves
mental and
consciousness phenomena. If there are non-material
aspects of reality, it is entirely possible,
and even to be expected,
that the
current laws of material physics need to be
extended, in much the same
way as
they have been in the past.
The
fact that a non-material mind interacts with
electrical brain processes
means
that there must be some sort of mind “force”
which
brings about this
interaction, the effects of which appear
objectively as the electrical
brain
activity that we observe and introspectively
as the changes in our
consciousness that we experience. The effects
of these mind
interactions are
almost certainly small, because the observed
interactions in the brain
are
physically small, on the order of
milliamperes.
Thus,
the law of conservation of energy is not, in
fact, violated, because
there is a
new fundamental entity, mind, and a new
“force”
which describes the nature of
its interaction in the world. The law of
conservation of physical
energy
becomes the law of conservation of energy-mind.
“All” that has been done here is to introduce
a new
concept which extends our
conception of reality. The precise nature of
mind and its interactions
still
need to be investigated, and whether mind
interactions with physical
processes
are amenable to mathematical description still
needs to be determined.
In
summary, reality includes “mind” which
interacts
with the physical brain, so
mind operates in the same “sphere of
interaction”
as matter and energy. The
basic conservation law is thus the
conservation of energy-mind. The
effect of
the self-conscious mind on electrical brain
activity does not appear to
be
relatively very large, so the mind component
of the conservation law is
probably also very small and manifests only in
subtle ways in ordinary
physical
reality.
Conclusions
The
phenomenon of the near-death experiencer’s
veridical
perceptions during the
out-of-body experience demonstrates the
existence of the self-conscious
mind
(SCM), separate from the physical body. In the
out-of-body state, the
mind is
completely independent of the body and is
non-material as far as can be
ascertained. Ordinarily, though, the SCM is
intimately united with the
brain
and body, and in this united state, the SCM
operates through
the brain. This view is also supported by
evidence from
neurological phenomena which suggest that a
non-material agency induces
conscious experience and self-conscious
awareness. These phenomena
include
electrical brain stimulation, subjective
backward referral or
antedating of
sensory experiences, large-scale neural
synchrony, Libet’s
delayed awareness of
willed action, split-brain phenomena,
hemispherectomy patients,
hydrocephalus
patients, decorticate patients, and phantom
limbs. The non-material
self-conscious mind and the brain interact in
some way by mutual
induction.
Various phenomena of neurological processes
can be reconsidered in
detail in
light of this view, and we believe such
efforts will prove very useful,
for
example in explaining phantom limb phenomena.
In our
conception of
mind and body, the highest cognitive
functions of thought,
memory, perception, feelings, and volition
operate in the non-material
mind.
The brain has a supportive role, supporting
all aspects of our
consciousness so
that we are conscious of our outer environs,
our selves, and our inner
mental
activities of thought, feeling and volition.
The necessity of
understanding the
function of the brain is not diminished by
this view. The brain is the
instrument and the mind is the operator.
Several
neurological phenomena suggest that there is a
process of
“coming to awareness”
wherein consciousness of sensory and mental
events dawns in our
awareness after
a certain duration of neural electrical
activity in the brain. Prior to
coming
to awareness, these events are subliminal in
our consciousness. This
subliminal
quality can be demonstrated through tests
where the subject is forced
to guess
what was perceived. The phenomena that show
the process of coming to
awareness
include the 500 msec delay in tactile sensory
awareness and the delayed
awareness of willed action. The latter implies
that even endogenous
mental
activity, such as the internal decision to
“act
now”, must have a certain
duration of electrical activity to come to our
awareness. Split-brain
patients also
demonstrate this phenomenon: in the
split-brain patient, perceptions
can be
restricted to the non-dominant hemisphere and
thus remain subliminal,
because
consciousness requires neural activity in the
dominant hemisphere as
the last
stage in coming to awareness.
The
split-brain patient also demonstrates that the
unity of consciousness
is
preserved even when significant neural damage
has occurred, in this
case that
the corpus callosum has been severed. Other
neurological phenomena also
suggest
that the integrity of selfhood continues even
when the cortical
structures are
severely altered or damaged. These phenomena
include hemispherectomy
patients,
hydrocephalus patients with extreme cortical
distortion and decorticate
patients. In each case there appears to be
significant transference of
cognitive
function to other cortical structures and
successful adaptation to
changes in
neural function. Cognitive functions continue
and, at least in the
first two
cases, near normal intellectual and motor
functions are possible even
with
extremely reduced or compromised cortical
structures.
These
phenomena are consistent with our view of the
autonomous agency
of the
SCM. The SCM accounts for the presence of a
whole person even in the
case of a
decorticate child, and for the continuity of
selfhood during severe
damage to
brain structures. The same principle of the
integrity of selfhood
applies to
numerous other instances of disability and
physiological degeneration:
despite
the sometimes extremely severe physical
limitations, there is a whole
individual present. The SCM adapts to the
altered cortical environment
and
gradually learns new mappings of neural
pathways to accomplish its
functions.
The process of adaptation appears to be
particularly successful when
the change
in the neural environment occurs gradually
over time. A sudden change
in neural
structure such as with brain trauma or stroke
appears to leave the SCM
overwhelmed and “isolated” from adaptive
neural
pathways. The learning of new
neural pathways by the SCM appears to be
facilitated by bodily
movements
in conjunction
with reacquiring cognitive skills.
Our research
papers
have endeavored to show
that the
non-material self-conscious mind is amenable
to scientific
investigation. In
particular, we expect that phantom limb
phenomena will provide a good
ground
for such investigation of the SCM. The phantom
limb is probably the
clearest demonstration
of the mind’s interaction with the body and
the brain. The
phantom mind-limb is
a non-material reality that interacts
semi-independently of the body
and brain
in unusual, counterintuitive ways which can be
explored experimentally.
General
principles of the self-conscious mind
From
our research,
we can
summarize some general principles of the
self-conscious mind (SCM):
- Autonomous
field of consciousness: In ordinary
consciousness, the SCM is an autonomous
“field of
consciousness” which is united with the
brain and body and is
spatially coincident with the physical body.
(A
“field” in this sense is an area or region
of space
having specific properties.) The SCM
interfaces with the body through
the electrical activity of the brain and
nervous system. The SCM is
generally united strongly with the brain and
body but can, in some
individuals, separate in the NDE and operate
for a time independently
of
the brain and body.
- Interaction even
though non-material: The SCM is
non-material and seemingly has little
interaction with physical
objects. Nevertheless during the NDE OBE,
the SCM appears to have
subtle interactions with solid objects with
a slight feeling of
resistance in passing through them, with
solid surfaces through
“touch”, with electromagnetic radiation
through
“visual perception”, and with sound
vibrations
through “hearing”. The out-of-body SCM
apparently
can sometimes be felt by ordinary people.
Therefore, the possibility of
a subtle form of interaction of the SCM with
the brain through the
nerves is reasonable. We would expect such
interactions to be very
small in magnitude. Such interactions would
constitute a form of
complementary mutual induction,
brain-to-mind and mind-to-brain, which
would likely be specifically “tuned” for
efficient
interaction between the brain and the mind.
- Integration and
interaction throughout the brain and body: The interaction of
the SCM with the brain appears to be via
large-scale, brain-wide
interactions. Furthermore, the SCM appears
to have a bodily structure
that projects throughout the physical body
and interacts through the
body neurons as well as the cortical
neurons. Both exogenous sensations
and endogenous mental states in the SCM are
reflected in the electrical
activity of the brain and their effects can
be seen in various forms of
brain imaging such as
electroencephalography (EEG) and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
- Operation through
the brain, coming to awareness: In ordinary
consciousness, the SCM operates through
the brain. All cognitive events, both
exogenous and endogenous, are
first subliminal and “come to awareness”
once there
has been sufficient electrical brain
activity. The electrical brain
activity apparently must include activity in
the dominant hemisphere in
order to achieve consciousness. The process
of coming to awareness
results in various delays in consciousness
with characteristic timings
(e.g., visual versus tactile perceptions),
and in the phenomenon of
subjective “antedating” of sensory
perceptions to
the actual time of the stimulus. Subliminal
perceptions are still
evident even when the stimuli are not
sufficient to come to conscious
awareness, for example, in forced choice
protocols.
- Cognitive functions
reside in the SCM: Since the SCM
retains full cognitive function when it is
separated from the body in
the NDE OBE, most cognitive functions reside
in the SCM, including
perception, volition, feeling, thought, and
memory. The brain is the
supportive instrument for consciousness. In
particular, memories are
“stored” in the SCM although the brain
mediates the formation
and recall
of memories while we are in the body. Memories thus
resist
destruction even with severe brain
damage or disease. Loss of
long-term
memory, for example in dementia, is
probably due to the destruction of
brain structures that assist with memory
recall, rather than
destructionof the memories themselves.
- Early childhood
development integrates the pre-existing
SCM: From NDEr accounts
during infancy, the SCM appears to
be already fully developed and complete at
the time of birth. Thus,
learning during infancy and early childhood
is a process of integrating
the fully-developed mind with the developing
body. The process of
integration of the SCM with the brain is
facilitated by bodily
movements
and this process influences the development
of brain structures. The
process of integration occurs most strongly
from birth through at least
age 7 or 8.
- Adaptation to
changes in neural structures: The SCM can adapt
to changes in neural structures such as may
occur with disease or
trauma, by transference of cognitive
function to other cortical
structures, such that near normal
intellectual and motor functions are
possible even with extremely reduced or
compromised cortical
structures. Successful adaptation is most
likely to occur when the
changes in cerebral structures have occurred
gradually over time.
Adaptation appears to be facilitated by
bodily movements in conjunction
with reacquiring cognitive skill.
- The seat of our
selfhood: Since the
individual experiences a continuity of the
sense of self during the
separation of the SCM from the body in the
NDE, the SCM is the locus of
our self-conscious awareness both within the
body and out of the body.
The SCM is thus our sense of self or
selfhood. Even when an individual
has significant physical or cognitive
disabilities or impairments, the
SCM, and therefore the person per se,
remains whole and complete.
Our view of the
mind
and body offers
a number
of
perspectives different from those currently
taken by most neuroscience
researchers:
- The
self-conscious
mind is an entity in its
own right
that interfaces with the
brain,
rather than an effect that
emerges from the brain’s
operation.
- When
neurological
functions become impaired, the mind exhibits
adaptability
in operating within the brain, rather than
the brain exhibits neural
plasticity.
- The mind is
the person per se, rather
than brain
processes determine the person.
- Significant
brain
impairment may impede the
mind from
operating but the mind and the person remain
whole, rather than brain impairment diminishes
mental function and thereby diminishes
the person.
- Memory resides
within the mind and uses the
brain for
memory formation and recall, rather than
memory is encoded
in the brain.
Our view of the
self-conscious mind can also inform various
practical realms, of which
we
present four
possibilities:
- For education,
the
insight that early childhood development is
a process of integrating
the fully developed mind with the infant’s
quickly developing
body and brain, can direct educators to
focus on the early stages of
development of the senses, thinking, motor
function, walking, and
speech. Early childhood education can then
work with these processes to
assist the integration of the mind with the
brain and body. In later
years, the child’s education can focus on
drawing out and
enhancing the innate capabilities of the
child’s mind.
- For problem
areas
involving memory, for example memory loss,
the insight that memory does
not reside in the brain may be helpful in
developing treatment
strategies. The processes of laying down
long term memories and
recovering them are mediated by specific
physical brain structures and
processes. Understanding that these
processes are really interface
processes with the non-material mind may
help focus research on the
memory acquisition and recall processes as interfaces
rather than on memory storage.
- For the broad
problem of autistic spectrum disorders,
observed differences in the
autistic child’s brain development may be
due to differences
in how the mind of the autistic child
interacts differently with the
brain. This insight could give clues for
understanding how autism
manifests and for developing strategies for
treatment.
- For the
problem of
rehabilitation from stroke and brain trauma,
the insight that the mind
always seeks to work through the brain and
will try to adapt when there
are neurological impairments, may be helpful
for treatment.
Rehabilitation strategies to help transfer
of mental, motor and speech
functions can be developed that will shift
cognitive functions to
unaffected areas of the brain. Such
strategies might include
sensorimotor activities that gradually
redirect the mind to use areas
that are contralateral to the lesion.
In
seeking the factors that influence individual
human development, we
generally
look at two areas: nature,
that is,
heredity and genetics which bring about the
structure of the body
including the
brain and nerve structures, and nurture,
that is, the environmental and experiential
influences during a
person’s life.
Our view posits a third factor besides these
two: mind
or more specifically the autonomous
self-conscious mind, that
is, the individual non-material aspects of the
person that are also
operant in
human development from birth. Where there is
confusion over which
factor has
been determinative in a particular situation,
nature or nurture, as in
cases,
for example, of genetically identical twins
raised in the same
environment but
who are not identical in all respects, the
factor of the individual
self-conscious mind is probably the operant
determinative factor. We
suspect
that mind plays a significant
determinative role in human development.
In
this view, our sense of self
is the self-conscious mind itself, rather than
a conceptual self that
emerges
from the operation of the brain’s neural
circuits. To be
sure, our awareness of our
self and
of much of the
rest of our experience of the world is
dependent on the operation of
neural
circuits while we are in our body. But because
the self-conscious mind
is
fundamentally independent of
our
brain, our sense that our self is in charge of
our destiny is, in fact,
true.
Acknowledgments
We
are very grateful to Mark J. Eisen, M.D. for a
number of helpful
insights about
the operation of the mind and body, and to
Susan Leonardo, Margaret
Heath,
James Hoesch, Connirae Andreas, and Nancy
Willson for their ideas and
their
thoughtful encouragement throughout our
research.
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